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Philosophy of education has, in many countries, and especially in America, assured 
place in, but at the same time is limited to, academic life: it constitutes a mandatory or 
optional subject matter in teacher training programs, in graduate programs, pedagogical 
institutes, or university departments of “education”. 
In these programs, philosophy of education is concerned with fixed and traditional 
objects: educational ends, activity related to the development of the child, curriculum 
conception, ethics, citizenship education, etc. A certain space is naturally devoted to the 
history of pedagogical ideas, from Antiquity to Dewey’s democratic education, including 
the Humanism of the Enlightenment or Rousseau’s negative education.  
Even more than other specialties (metaphysics, logic, political philosophy), philosophy 
of education exists as a normal discipline, in the sense of what Thomas Kuhn has called a 
“normal science” in his seminal work (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). 
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The adjective first means that in the realm of this discipline, we work at responding to 
institutional demands, which maintain research and teachers’ sayings in rather defined 
frames (in this respect, even vague discourses and slogans can remain “normal”). But 
“normal discipline” also means that striking novelty is rare, inexistent or in part artificial, 
and that in regards to other research or intellectual streams, this discipline is in a situation 
of heterogeneity. In what gets published as philosophy of education, references to large 
theories produced outside the field (often those feeding the public debate of the moment) 
are, as a matter of fact, a standard feature and can descend into a name-dropping 
competition. In France for example, where philosophy of education only has a very modest 
presence as an academic field, it very hard to quote recent contributions Marcel Gauchet, 
who participates of a much wider reflection on the present of the democratic demand.  
There are two types of reasons for this situation. 
On the one hand, the massification of educational systems have brought schooling as 
well as broader educational problems, to a degree of complexity never encountered before. 
Montaigne designated the “institution of kids” as “the most difficult of the humane 
sciences”: the progress of science only added to this difficulty. 
On the other hand, this massification was accompanied, almost everywhere, by a 
depreciation of the work of teachers: in the academic field, reflections in education did not 
gain more prestige. Although we know better than ever to what extent the destiny of 
societies is linked to the performances and characteristics of their educational systems, it is 
as if the conditions of schooling or more generally of education, were considered by the 
best minds as either despairing subjects, or as not worth any of their efforts. 
The problem is thus: which questions should philosophy of education concentrate on in 
order to demonstrate its aptitude to answer to contemporary demands, and doing so, to 
conquer the part of well needed recognition so enormously lacking nowadays? 
What is criticized in many parts of the world is a so-called loss of efficiency or 
effectiveness in teaching. Its causes can be multiple: poor school structures, weight of 
family and social suffering, bad curriculum organization, insufficient attention to learning 
difficulties, shortage of qualified teachers, but also students’ scepticism towards studies, 
distrustful attitude towards the institution and adults in general, power of group logics, 
impact of new technologies on students’ attention, feeling of the obsolescence of “classic” 
school values, etc. 
These diverse aspects of what must be named, with prudence, a historical crisis of the 
form of schooling are too often studied in a segmented way. It would be more appropriate 
not to try to unite them in a totalizing analysis, but to address each one with the concern of 
highlighting their relation to the others. But lacking in the usual approaches to these 
phenomena is also a certain form of boldness in the conception and discussion of new rules, 
adjusted to the present reality. 
We must say “in the discussion of new rules”, and not only in their conception, because 
the philosophical dimension of a process relies on the methodical character of a discussion. 
But imagination is here necessary, and we suggest that it can and must be articulated to a 
confrontation of the present with the past – a past that is not simply one of the schooling 
institutions, but one of the great texts on education. 
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One could, for example, read the pedagogical writings of Erasmus, the treatise, Liberal 
Education of Children (1529) or the De ratione studii [Study plan] (1512). These texts 
present an intensive literary educational model where the preceptor teaches in a soft and 
playful atmosphere. This private education, influenced by the idea that “almost all that 
seems worthy of being known” has been written in ancient languages, is very far from us. 
However, besides the legitimate promotion of softness and play, the idea of a preparation to 
the knowledge of things through the knowledge of words is not one that can be swept away 
either. 
From the classical age, the drifts and limits of a pedagogy founded on books have been 
systematically brought to the fore: this does not mean that the ideal of the humanist culture 
has been, as it were, integrally “deconstructed”. Instead of borrowing a purely adaptative 
model of education from contemporary psychology, philosophy of education must meditate 
on the destiny of more ancient models and in doing so, determine what actuality and 
validity they have kept. This does not refer only to the relation that contemporary 
education, despite its particular aims, keeps with certain forms of tradition: it refers to the 
relation that philosophical reflection must keep with the most solid and refined intellectual 
constructions produced in the field. Although the gap between classical models and actual 
conditions of contemporary pedagogical activity may have widened to an abyss, there still 
remain from these models sufficient substance and authority to guide the pedagogical 
thought, i.e. precisely to make it determine, in a new environment, what can be preserved 
and diffused from an ancient impulse. 
To care for an impulse that will be renewed only through its own remembrance, is what we 
call today “giving meaning back” to practices in danger of loosing their own. Which 
program could stand out more and concentrate in itself more on all of the dimensions of 
philosophy? As for the many problems such a gesture will encounter, it is only once the 
necessity of this gesture has been recognized that the many problems it will create can be 
distinguished. 
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